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1. Introduction
Over the past decades the mechanisms driving strategic fiscal policy interactions between
governments have received increasing attention in both, academic literature, and in the
public debate. While the latter is mainly driven by discussions about tax evasion and
international tax havens, the early academic literature focused on local governments
within one country. The literature on fiscal federalism has emphasized that two kinds
of externalities can result from the existence of governments operating in a multi-tiered
system. On the one hand, a horizontal externality can arise when fiscal choices of one local
level jurisdiction affect fiscal decisions made by other competing jurisdictions at the same
level of government. This happens for instance when governments try to attract a mobile
tax base (see Wilson (1999) for a survey) or the politicians attempt to maximize their
reelection prospects (Besley and Case, 1995). On the other hand, a vertical externality
can arise because of fiscal interactions between different layers of government. This is
particularly the case when those governmental layers share the same tax base.
The majority of empirical studies focus on the horizontal tax interdependencies between
local governments that belong to the same national country. In addition, a small and
recent literature has spent attention on fiscal interactions between different countries.
Public debate, however, has also focused on international tax competition between central
governments, but generally neglects internal country differences on the sub-national level.
The French President recently stated that the differences between the French and the
German tax systems put France at a disadvantage. ”I cannot accept the disadvantages
to our competitive potential compared to our most important client and most important
trading partner”, Sarkozy said in a television interview. Our measure of the overall tax
burden for companies shows, that allowing for variation in sub-national tax rates, some
French regions are remaining competitive compared to some German jurisdictions in our
sample.
The existing empirical literature on horizontal fiscal policy interactions is strictly dis-
tinguishable by the level of government where the interaction takes place. Hence, till
now interactions are either investigated domestically on the local level or internationally
on the central level. Our research instead acknowledges that local level government tax
interactions can occur across national borders.
Tax systems in Europe have been shaped over the last decades by two main trends, the
European Integration process and decentralization. When national governments decide
to transfer competencies to sub-national governments, they have to find a way to finance
them. Two possibilities exist: an increase in tax autonomy by the devolution of local
taxing powers through new tax instruments or an increase in transfers from the central
government.
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Endowing local governments with a specific local tax is not without consequences,
especially when this tax affects a mobile tax base. In addition, the process of economic
integration among the countries of the European Union raises numerous questions of fiscal
coordination among member states. Our point is that in a highly integrated economic
area with an Internal Market, like the European Union, products and factors are free to
move across borders. While indirect taxation is harmonized by several agreements, factor
income taxation is not. Indeed, in the absence of taxation and other infrastructural or
institutional barriers, investment would take place where production costs are lower. The
introduction of taxes distorts this decision, since the firm is lured by the location where
after-tax profits are the highest. For this reason, company taxation has attracted a great
deal of attention as an important element for the operability of the Internal Market.
Thus, an investigation of interactions between local governments that have a substantial
degree of discretion over taxes in different countries seems to be both, an interesting, but
also an empirical demanding question.
Beside local taxation, many elements of the tax system affect a firm’s net-of-tax profits.
These elements vary only across countries, not across jurisdiction in a given country.
When foreign jurisdictions, with their different taxation systems, are regarded as well,
elements of the tax code adopted by higher level governments come into play, since they
are no longer equal for all sub-national authorities. Local peculiarities finally generate
a very multifaceted bandwidth of potential after-tax profits in different regions beyond
national borders. Nevertheless, the scope of lower level governments to attract mobile
factors is limited. It is very unlikely that communities in Lapland observe and react
to fiscal choices undertaken in Andalusia. The literature on local interactions reveals
that proximity is an important element, and only jurisdictions within a certain distance
matter. The second point is that tax interactions are only likely to occur when sub-
national governments are equipped with fiscal instruments on which they have a high
degree of discretion, and if they are able to influence significantly the after-tax profits of
firms.
The German-French context offers an interesting example, since both conditions are
fulfilled. In both countries the local level has an intense impact on the overall tax burden
of firms. French and German municipalities can set a tax on business activities, beside
a local tax on properties. These taxes generate an additional tax burden that firms
have to pay. Furthermore, Germany and France share a large common border along the
Rhine Valley. Therefore, our empirical strategy disentangles interactions between local
governments of these two particular countries in that region.
Our main results show that spatial correlation in the taxes set by local governments
is solely driven by domestic effects. Furthermore, we are able to distinguish between an
effect due to the border or due to one that arises because of infrastructural disadvan-
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tages. In our particular case, the Franco-German border coincides with the Rhine River.
Crossing the Rhine is only possible where infrastructure, such as ferries or bridges, allows
that. Taking this into account does not change the main finding of this paper. Local
interactions are a domestic issue.
This paper is organized in the following way: The next section provides facts about sub-
national taxes in France and Germany. Section three summarizes the existing empirical
literature. In section 4, we present the empirical specification and the peculiarities of
our specific context. Our dataset is introduced in section 5. The results are presented in
section 6. The paper comes to a close in the last section.
2. Subnational Tax Systems in France and Germany
Almost all Member States of the European Union are characterized by a trend towards
decentralization over the last decades. Competencies have been transferred from the cen-
tral level to sub-national governments. In turn, those governments have sometimes been
equipped with tax instruments to generate the revenues to fulfill their responsibilities.
Local authorities can substantially influence the overall tax burden of firms in France
and in Germany, but it should be acknowledged that the available tax instruments are
different. This section explains the characteristics of the French and German local fiscal
system, respectively.
French local jurisdictions can influence the professional tax (taxe professionelle, tp)
and German municipalities can control the local trade tax (Gewerbesteuer, gs). Local
governments can also choose a tax rate on real estate in both countries. The share of
revenues that arise from these tax sources is depicted in figure 1. Municipalities in both
countries have to generate a substantial share of revenues on their own, measured as the
total share of revenues. In 2007, Germany had about one quarter of the share of own
resources in total local revenues and France had more than one third for their sub-national
governments.
[Figure 1 about here]
Standard models of tax competition predict that local policymakers can use these in-
struments to make their territory attractive for investment. However, beside the fact that
local governments can decide on the tax rate, both systems have important differences
that exist on the sub-national (different tax base) and national (especially in capital al-
lowances) level, which requires further explanation. The aim of this section is to show
how we translate the formal tax code on the local level into our measure of the tax bur-
den. Tax systems have been subject to several reforms and changes in either country. We
describe the rules valid during the sample period of 2000-2007 in the following part.
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2.1. Local Characteristics: The French Case
The structure of French sub-national governments has four tiers. The lowermost level
consists of around 36,000 municipalities, divided into more than 13,000 groups of munici-
palities (known as Etablissements Publics de Coope´ration Intercommunale). The middle-
tier consists of 96 departments while the top level is formed by the 22 regions. Our paper
focuses on the lowest level of government.
Business is taxed on all governmental levels. Beside the national corporate income tax
(impoˆt sur les socie´te´s, cit), corporate taxpayers are subject to two sub-national taxes:
a local business tax (taxe professionnelle, tp) and a real estate tax (taxe foncie`re, tf).
The statutory rates ttp and ttf are set annually by the local authorities and vary between
regions, departments and municipalities. The consolidated tax rate is the sum of rates
across sub-national levels.
The groups of municipalities may choose to set a single business tax rate (taxe pro-
fessionnelle unique) which applies to all municipalities belonging to the inter-municipal
group or to apply an additional tax rate on each of the local taxes. In the first case, the
municipalities do not set their own business tax rate. The municipal cooperation there-
fore acts as merging jurisdictions. In the second case, a new level of local government
sets their own additional tax rate, which strengthens tax base sharing.
The professional tax is a local business tax levied on tangible fixed assets, like machin-
ery, and on buildings. The tax base is the rental value σ of the tangible fixed assets used
for the purpose of the business.1 For buildings, tax law defines the rental value as 8% of
the value of the buildings, whereas for machinery, the rental value is 16% of the value.
In either case a general deduction of 16% applies and the local tax is deductible from the
corporate income tax (tcit). Therefore, the effective rate is given by
Ttp = (1− tcit)σ(1− 0.16)ttp
The taxe foncie`re as the real estate tax is levied on the owner of residential properties
situated within France. The tax base is obtained after applying a 50% allowance to the
rental value. The effective rate accounts for the deductibility from corporate income tax
Ttf = (1− tcit)σttf
1We adopt this parameter from Devereux et al. (2008), see table 8 in A for details.
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2.2. Local Characteristics: The German Case
Germany has two sub-national governmental levels: sixteen federal states (Bundesla¨nder)
and around 12,000 municipalities or cities as the lowest level of government. The German
framework of public finance is a complex system, based on revenue-sharing and equaliza-
tion schemes between all governmental layers. The profits of corporations in Germany are
subject to two different taxes. The central government levies a tax on corporate profits
(Ko¨rperschaftsteuer, cit). Revenues are shared with the federal states since they have no
power to tax business activities.
The trade tax (Gewerbesteuer, gs) is the German local business tax and is a tax on
profits earned by corporations and self-employed persons. A share from this tax has to
be given to the states and the federal level. The tax base consists of profits of business
enterprises as determined under income tax law or corporation tax law. Each local
authority has discretion over a so called collection rate cgs. These collection rates can be
transformed into a ordinary statutory tax rate expressed in percentages. Therefore, the
collection rate has to be devided by 100 and multiplied by a specific value (5% under our
assumptions)2 designated by law which implements a degree of progressivity into the tax
code. In addition, the tax liability is deductible from its own tax base and the tax base of
the corporate income tax (see Scheﬄer (2002) for details of the German tax code). The
adjusted effective tax rate can then be calculated by
Tgs =
5
100 ·
cgs
100 · (1− Tgs) · (1− tcit)
⇔ Tgs = cgs2000 + cgs (1− tcit)
A second local tax is the municipal real estate tax (Grundsteuer, pt). Each municipality
has the right to choose a collection rate for this tax cpt and could distinguish between
agricultural and other areas. We will focus on the latter. The effective rate accounts
for the deductibility of real estate taxes from corporate income taxation (tcit). It is
determined by
Tpt = σ(1− tcit)cpt
Other studies on international tax-comparisons, for example Devereux et al. (2008), as-
sume that the tax base of the real estate tax amounts to 25% of the acquisition costs, see
table 8 in A for details.
These elements are the main ingredients for the calculation of our measure of the local
2We focus in our setting on the highest multiplier, which is in fact applied to all incorporated firms.
Their share of the total tax base in 2004 was about 55%. Nevertheless, results do not change for any
other value since this multiplier is just a linear transformation.
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tax burden. We compute municipal specific effective average tax rates and take the
elements that vary between sub-national governments into account. The computation is
explained in more detail in A. The resulting tax rates are presented when we introduce
our data set. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note at this stage that tax rates vary
substantially, and that the local impact on the tax burden is not small in both countries.
3. Strategic Interactions in France and Germany
The existence of strategic interactions among fiscal authorities is a common prediction of
the tax competition (surveyed by Wilson (1999)) and the yardstick competition (Besley
and Case, 1995) literature. The reason behind the strategic component in tax rates
is an outflow of mobile capital in the former case, while under yardstick competition
incentives of politicians are causing the interactions. The empirical literature in this field
aims at testing for the existence of strategic interactions among governments. These
models are usually implemented empirically through the estimation of a fiscal reaction
function, where the optimal tax rate in a jurisdiction depends on the tax rates in nearby
jurisdictions (view Revelli (2006) for a survey of empirical models).
Most subsequent empirical studies concentrate on tax interactions among local juris-
dictions within a country or among the states within a federal country (see Brueckner
(2003) for a survey). In addition, a more recent empirical literature focused on interna-
tional tax competition (Redoano, 2007; Devereux et al., 2008; Cassette and Paty, 2008).
Those studies show that industrialized countries compete over statutory and effective
average tax rates of the corporate tax. It has been argued that tax competition (and not
yardstick competition) over corporate taxes is the most plausible explanation for these
results, since most voters are ignorant of the domestic corporate tax rate and therefore do
not take them into account when evaluating the performance of the incumbent. However,
for income taxes and public expenditures, the existing fiscal interactions would possibly
be the result of yardstick competition.
Hereafter, we will only discuss the empirical tests centered at the municipal level in
France and Germany. Most papers dealing with other countries3 find empirical evidence
of positive interactions among sub-national governments using various sets of data on
local property or business tax rates.
The local business tax is the major source of tax revenue for local governments in
France. Hence, it is not surprising that empirical tests are mainly concerned with this
3Including those of Brett and Pinkse (2000) in Canada, Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) in Belgium,
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) in the US, Revelli (2001) in the UK, Feld and Reulier (2009) in Switzer-
land, Sole´-Olle´ (2003) in Spain, Bordignon et al. (2003) in Italy, Edmark and A˚gren (2008) in Sweden,
and Allers and Elhorst (2005) in the Netherlands
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tax.4 All the papers dealing with spatial interactions at the municipal level found evidence
of tax interactions. Jayet et al. (2002) only focus on horizontal interactions when investi-
gating tax interactions in France. They attempt to check the existence of tax mimicking
between municipalities belonging to so-called employment zones5 in the region Nord-Pas
de Calais (Northern France). Tax interactions among neighbor municipalities are found
in urban areas but not in rural ones. Charlot and Paty (2007, 2010) study spatial fiscal
interactions among municipalities controlling for vertical fiscal interactions and taking
into account agglomeration forces. They also observe significant mimicking behavior be-
tween jurisdictions when choosing their local business tax rate, and vertical interactions
between municipalities and regions.
While the academic literature in the French setting is quite rich, less attention has been
spent on strategic interactions in Germany. In a panel-data set from a German state
(Baden-Wuerttemberg), Buettner (2001) finds that tax rates are strategic complements,
i.e. that the best response to an increase in adjacent municipalities’ tax rates is to raise
the own tax rate as well. The prediction that the tax base is not only affected by the
own tax rate but also by the tax rate established in neighboring jurisdictions is verified,
among others, by Buettner (2003) for German local governments, but the effect is rather
small. Interestingly, the regional sample of these studies is located in a federal state that
includes the border-region and a set of dummies is used to pick up regions particularly
exposed to international competition. Results suggest that within a bandwidth of 30
kilometers distance to the border, significant effects are at work. However, this is not
worked out in detail since the data-set ends at the German frontier.
To our knowledge, no empirical study tests the existence of local tax interactions across
national borders. From the theoretical context, as long as capital is perfectly mobile, there
exists no reason why politicians and voters should only take the behavior of adjacent
municipalities of one’s own country into account. Furthermore, one should expect that
the introduction of a single currency leads to higher mobility within Europe and higher
tax interactions between countries to attract tax bases. Since this effect has already been
found at the national level, a test for international interactions on the local level is a gap
in the literature, that we want to fill with our contribution.
4Empirical studies using French data have also been performed at departmental level (Leprince et al.,
2007; Dubois et al., 2007) and regional level (Feld and Rocaboy, 2003).
5These zones correspond to a statistical category defined administratively by the central government
that gathers municipalities that are geographically closed to each other and quite homogeneous in terms
of socio-economic characteristics.
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4. From Theory to Empirics
This section describes how we get from theory to empirical models that are able to test
our main hypotheses. While theoretical arguments do not differ much from standard
models of tax competition, our empirical strategy is specific to our context and distinct
from previous papers regarding local interactions.
4.1. Theoretical Background
Following Brueckner (2003), the residents’ utility of municipality i (ui) depends on their
private consumption (ci) and on the quantity of public goods provided by the local gov-
ernment (gi), thus
ui = u(ci(ki), gi(ki);Xi) (1)
where Xi is a vector of characteristics of the jurisdiction, such as demographic at-
tributes, reflecting preferences and needs of the local population. ki is the resource used
as the tax base in that jurisdiction (capital used by firms for production). The demand
for capital depends on the fiscal environment in the jurisdiction because firms maximize
after-tax profits. As in the basic model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), a perfectly
competitive firm produces output by a twice differentiable, constant returns to scale
production function under the assumption that labor is locally fixed:
fi(ki, li), with l = 1, and fk > 0 > fkk
As discussed above, sub-national governments in France and Germany can tax a dif-
ferent local tax base. The French local tax could be seen as a unit capital tax while the
German local business tax is a tax on profits. After local-tax profits of firms are thus
different in both countries. Maximizing the respective profit function yields the profit
maximizing first order conditions for the demand for capital in either country:6
∂Πi
∂ki
=
 f
′(ki)(1− Tgs)− r = 0 for Germany
f ′(ki)− Ttp − r = 0 for France
(2)
Under the assumption that capital is perfectly mobile, equilibrium of the capital mar-
ket implies that the after-tax rate of return equalizes across jurisdictions, independent of
the applied tax instrument. Furthermore, Lockwood (2004) shows that, although a juris-
diction cares about which tax instrument its rivals use, the jurisdiction itself is indifferent
6These equations are simplified since we only take the local business taxes into account. However,
the underlying problem is similar for other taxes.
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between these instruments since for any tax rate on profits a revenue equivalent unit rate
exists. Hence we define τ as the effective average tax rate, that is the tax burden for a
one-unit hypothetical investment project. We can transform the German profit tax into
a per unit tax by writing Tgs = τf ′(ki) . Since taxes in France are already expressed per
unit, the equilibrium on the capital market for both countries implies
f ′(ki) = r + τ (3)
as the profit-maximizing condition for jurisdictions in both countries. The tax rate τ
is the measure of the tax burden which we use in our empirical estimations. Beside the
transformation between different tax bases, this measure is able to depict further elements
of the tax code. For example, the coexistence of real estate taxes on the municipal level
is regarded in this measure.
Now define ϕ as the inverse of f ′(ki) and the demand for capital is given by
ki = ϕ(r + τ) (4)
Market clearing requires that
m∑
i=1
ϕ(r + τ)i +
n∑
i=m+1
ϕ(r + τ)i =
n∑
i=1
ki (5)
where m is the share of municipalities in one of the two respective countries. The last
two equations show that the capital demand depends on all tax rates and differentiation
of (4, 5) gives ∂ϕ
∂τi
< 0, i.e. capital flees by an increase of the effective average tax rate.
Maximization of (1) subject to the capital demand equilibrium (5) and (4) yields that
the optimal tax policy depends on tax rates elsewhere and own local characteristics. The
resulting reaction function is given by
τi = τ(τ−i, Xi)
where the notation −i indicates all municipalties other than i.
This result, however, holds only if and only if capital is perfectly mobile between the
two countries. Another point of view is that capital first adjusts on the country level, i.e.
the two countries compete over their shares, say α and (1 − α). Once proportions are
fixed, each municipality can only try to be attractive so that the firm prefers to locate
in their area rather than in a nearby municipality of the same country. In that case
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interactions reduce to the standard within country case and domestic tax rates are only
a function of nearby domestic policy choices.
τi∈[1,m] = τ(τ−i∈[1,m], Xi)
τi∈[m+1,n] = τ(τ−i∈[m+1,n], Xi)
Proposition 1. In the absence of restrictions to the mobility of capital, tax rates are a
function of all other domestic and foreign tax rates, irrespective of the tax base. As soon
as capital is once fixed in either country, only domestic interactions take place.
Hence, a local jurisdiction in either country could interact with the fiscal policy enacted
in local jurisdictions of both countries. To test the existence of tax interactions among
local governments, we estimate reduced-form tax reaction functions which allow us to
distinguish the effects between countries from those effects arising within one country.
These estimations could also be seen as an indirect test of the mobility of capital between
the two regions on their respective side of the frontier. We present our estimation strategy
in the following section.
4.2. Identification
Our main question of interest is whether there is any correlation between local tax rates
across national borders. Existing empirical work that disentangles the effects between
different sub-groups utilized fixed effects methods (e.g. Cassette and Paty (2008) with
GMM methods, Ge´rard et al. (2010) with ML estimators).
To test the existence of tax interactions among local governments, we need to estimate
the reduced-form reaction function, which can be expressed in a linear form such as
τit = ρ
∑
j 6=i
wijτ−i,t +Xitβ + ηi + υt + εit (6)
where ρ is the parameter associated to the weighted average of competing govern-
ments’ tax rates, β is the parameter associated to the socio-economic characteristics of
municipality i, ηi is a municipal fixed effect, υt is a time fixed effect and finally εit is a
random term. The weighting scheme wij defines, as usual in applied spatial econometrics,
which other local governments have to be regarded as neighbors. We describe the choice
of weights in more detail in the following section, since our context requires a careful
construction of the respective elements.
In order to distinguish the influence of competing municipalities that belong to the
same country from the effect of competing municipalities that do not belong to the same
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country, we need to consider three different cases regarding the influence of competing
municipalities’ tax rates. The empirical reaction function can be written as
τit = ρ1
∑
j 6=i
wdeij τ−i∈[1,m],t (7)
+ ρ2
∑
j 6=i
wfrij τ−i∈[m+1,n],t
+ ρ3
∑
j 6=i
wborderij τ−i,t +Xitβ + ηi + υt + εit
where ρ1 is the parameter associated to the weighted average of other jurisdictions’
tax rates that belong to Germany if municipality i is also a German one. ρ2 instead is
the parameter associated to the weighted average of other jurisdictions’ tax rates that
belong to France if municipality i belongs to France. All elements in the weighting matrix
wdeij and w
fr
ij are equal to zero if the i and j elements are from different countries. The
coefficient ρ3 instead measures the effect associated to the weighted average of other
jurisdictions’ tax rates that do not belong to the same country as country i. Hence, the
elements of the weighting matrix wborderij are equal to zero if municipality i and j are
associated with the same country and different from zero otherwise.7
Parameters ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 will thus measure the degree of tax interactions respectively
among German municipalities, among French municipalities, and finally between French
and German municipalities. In practice, we are decomposing the spatial process in three
parts. This matrix decomposition was first used by Ge´rard et al. (2010) and does not
apply any standardization of the individual sub-matrices.
Since interactions are supposed to be strategic, the tax rates are jointly determined and
thus endogenous. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the parameters of equation
(7) are inconsistent (Anselin, 1988). In order to deal with the endogeneity of competing
municipalities’ tax variables on the right hand side, we use an instrumental variables
approach as proposed by Kelejian and Robinson (1993) and Kelejian and Prucha (1998).
We use spatial lags of some covariates as well as the one period lag of the spatially lagged
tax rates as instruments. The validity of the set of instruments is verified by a Hansen-J
test after each regression. We investigate the appropriateness of lags as instruments by
conducting a difference in Hansen test on this subset.
It is worth to note that tax rates in such a framework could be serially correlated,
for example because changes in tax rates might be costly to implement by governments.
We estimate the covariance matrix of the parameters in model 7 according to Newey
and West (1987) with standard errors that are robust to both, heteroskedasticity and
7In matrix form, the initial model τ = ρWτ+βX+ε, becomes τ = ρ1W deτ+ρ2W frτ+ρ3W borderτ+
βX + ε with W = W de +W fr +W border.
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autocorrelation (HAC).
To capture possible dynamic effects, we reestimate the model and include a time-lagged
dependent variable to control for persistency in tax rates
τit = γτi,t−1+ρ1
∑
j 6=i
wdeij τ−i∈[1,m],t (8)
+ρ2
∑
j 6=i
wfrij τ−i∈[m+1,n],t
+ρ3
∑
j 6=i
wborderij τ−i,t +Xitβ + ηi + υt + εit
The presence of the lagged dependent variable in equation 8 together with fixed effects
and spatial lags requires the use of a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator
as suggested by Kukenova and Monteiro (2009) and applied in Cassette and Paty (2008),
namely difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The difference GMM estimator
corrects for the endogeneity of the spatial lags. This estimator takes first differences to
estimate the equation and uses lags of the dependent variables from at least two periods
earlier, as well as lags of the right-hand side exogenous variables, as instruments.
The robustness of our regression is evaluated with usual tests after difference GMM
estimations. Again, a Hansen-J test examines the hypothesis that the instruments are
not correlated with the residuals. A second required test is proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991). This test, denoted AR(2), examines the hypothesis that the residuals from
the first-differenced estimating equation are not second-order correlated. Both statistics
are necessary to confirm the validity of the instruments used. An accurate choice of the
instruments solves the problem of the instruments proliferation (Roodman, 2009), and
the number of instruments we use does not impair the power of the Hansen test statistic.
5. Data
Subject to our study are local governments in the Franco-German border area. In order
to focus on the effects arising due to possible interactions across this border, we include all
municipalities located within a certain bandwidth (20 and 30 km distance of a municipal-
ities’ centroid) to the border into our sample. We focus on those local governments that
belong either to the German federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg or those in the French
departments Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin. Figure 2 depicts the region from which we draw
our sample. The shaded areas represent our two distance based sub-samples, respectively.
On the French side, local governments belonging to a City Union that chooses the single
tax rate regime are aggregated since fiscal policy decisions are taken jointly. We have
eventually 347 or 602 municipalities included in the small or large sample, respectively.
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[Figure 2 about here]
Our dataset provides information on an annual basis over the period 2000-2007 and
could be divided into two broad categories: taxation and socio-economic variables. Before
we describe that part of our dataset, we demonstrate how geographical features and
proximity is introduced in our setup via spatial weights.
5.1. Spatial Weights
According to Tobler (1970) ”everything is related to everything else, but near things are
more related than distant things.” In the literature on tax competition, governments are
assumed to take account of the flight of capital to neighboring jurisdictions caused by an
increase in its own tax rate. Thus, a scheme that assigns weights based on geographical
distance or contiguity is frequently used in the empirical literature.
First, based on the Euclidian distance, we treat different numbers of close-by jurisdic-
tions as neighbors. The weighting scheme WNN6 for instance establishes a connection to
the six closest municipalities and assigns a weight of wNN6ij = 1/6 to each of them. In the
context of international interactions only jurisdictions from the foreign country are re-
garded as potential candidates for neighbors. In other words, each domestic municipality
is connected to only those on the other side of the border.8
Another possibility is to express neighborship in terms of pure air-line distance. This
scheme is given by the weight matrix WDIST and imposes a smooth distance decay, with
weights given by wDISTij , where dij is the Euclidian distance between the centroid of
municipality i and municipality j, after standardization
wDISTij =
1/dij∑
j
1/dij
We use cut-off criteria to exclude municipalities from beeing neighbors if they exceed
either a 15km or a 30km distance threshold.
A nice feature of our dataset is that the border between Germany and France coincides
with the Rhine River. This allows us to reformulate the weighting scheme in order to take
the local infrastructure into account. Crossing the border is only possible where bridges
or ferries establish a connection between the two countries. Our weights are calculated
as the nearest possible way to cross the river from municipality i with dry feet to reach
municipality j in the other country. A comparison of the ρ3 parameter with pure distance
and this measure could reveal whether actually the border itself or the infrastructure to
secure mobility is important for tax rate interactions.
8wij = 0 if i and j are from the same country but can be different from zero otherwise.
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5.2. Taxation data
Taxation data is the core element of our dataset. We compute effective average tax
rates (EATR) in order to depict the overall burden borne by firms within a certain
fiscal environment. These measures are often applied in studies on international tax
comparisons and the tax competition literature on the national level. We apply the
framework developed by Devereux and Griffith (2003).
The rates calculated by this method basically arise from taking a specific form of
investment, using specific sources of financing. The methodology adopted to compute
these effective average tax rates is provided in A. Since we are interested in the part on
which a local government can have an impact upon, we calculate the local EATR by
setting all elements of the tax code, not under local discretion, equal to zero. By doing
so, in the end our measure turns out to be highly correlated with local statutory tax
rates. We expect a positive impact of neighbors’ tax rates on the own tax rate, as shown
in earlier contributions. However, we are interested in the impact of foreign fiscal policy
choices on the domestic decisions taken in the home country.
In addition, we introduce a measure of the tax burden due to higher level governments,
including the national corporate income tax. This is included to take into account poten-
tial vertical interactions in the setting of the local tax rates. In contrary to the calculation
of the local tax rate, we here set everything under the discretion of the bottom level equal
to zero. This procedure permits us to get a comparable measure of the tax burden for
the local and the higher levels, because in France the tax base differs between the central
tax on firms (corporate income tax based on profits) and the sub-national taxes. More-
over, effective tax rates permit to account for differences between the two countries in
the composition of the corporate income tax base (especially in capital allowances).
[Figure 3 about here]
Figure 3 puts strength on the argumentation that local governments in the two respec-
tive countries have the possibility to interact with their fiscal policy instruments. Each
dot represents the overall effective average tax rate, either in France (gray) or in Germany
(black). Since these two are spread on the same interval after 2000, municipalities have
potentially the power to compete with their foreign neighbor.
Nevertheless, French municipalities have a lower share on the overall tax burden (differ-
ence between the line and each dot) than their German counterparts. However, after the
2000 drop in the corporate income tax in Germany, a French municipality could compete
with a German one, even when the additional part of the tax burden has to be much
smaller.
[Table 1 about here]
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Table 1 shows summary statistics for the effective tax rates and the additional vertical
tax burden in both countries. We are taking the logs of all tax variables in our empirical
estimation.9
5.3. Socio-economic Data
Socio-economic variables are introduced to control for different spending needs or prefer-
ences for public goods in the local jurisdictions. We include variables that reflect the age
distribution as well as the population density and unemployment rate.
[Table 2 about here]
The municipalities in our sample are different in terms of population size. In both
countries the share of small jurisdictions is quite substantial, while only a handful of
large cities (namely Strasbourg, Freiburg, Baden-Baden) is included. Table 2 presents
the summary statistics for our control variables. On average French municipalities are
denser than the German ones, which is, given the structure of local governments in both
countries, not surprising. The demographic characteristics in both countries are slightly
different. Generally speaking, the region in France is populated by younger inhabitants.
Since the age structure might reflect preferences over public expenditures, these two
characteristics of the population are likely to have an impact on tax rates. For example,
the working population is more likely to be in favor of a tax policy oriented to create a
good business environment than the older population, whose demand for public goods
might be higher. The younger generation is also important, since parents would like to
send their children to kindergarten. These kinds of expenditures are imposed at the local
level in both countries. We include the unemployment rate since local authorities have
certain obligations to unemployed people, such as covering housing-costs in Germany.
In addition, the number of unemployed people could be a proxy for the cyclical stance.
Furthermore, the log of regional GDP is, one period lagged, included. This controls for
the economic conditions and the fact that tax rates usually react one period later to
economic outcomes.
6. Results
This section discusses the results from our empirical analysis. We focus in what follows
on one specific set of results, namely those obtained from the small distance sample with
weights constructed by a criterion that regards the six nearest municipalities as neighbors.
9Summary statistics presented here are for the large sample which included all elements in the 30km
distance-band to the Rhine.
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All further results are reported in full length in B, but our main result remains unchanged
in all estimated models.
Table 3 shows the results of instrumental variables estimations according to equation
7. We instrument the endogenous spatial lags with all regressors plus their spatial lags,
beside the neighbor’s tax rate. In that case, we use one time lagged values as an additional
instrument. Moreover, the spatial lags of the demographic variables are excluded from the
set of instruments since we cannot reject correlation with the residuals. The computed
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (HAC).
[Table 2 about here]
The first estimation (1) presents results from a model that neglects the spatial variables.
We will first discuss the impact of the exogenous variables. The age structure matters in
both countries. Compared to the group of inhabitants between 15 and 65, a larger share
of young people decreases the tax rate. This might be due to the fact that, although
communities have to provide services to this group, their parents are in favor of business
friendly politics since they are most likely in working age. The impact of the share of the
older population is distinct for France and Germany. More older people increase the tax
in Germany, while it decreases local taxes in France. Thus, German municipalities might
need to generate more revenues to fulfill the preferences of the aged. Both countries try to
counteract unemployment by lowering their tax rates in order to establish an attractive
environment for business activities. Unlike in Germany, the French local taxes are also
on average higher in more densely populated and richer regions. The positive sign on the
vertical component suggests at first glance that local taxes act in concert with those on
other levels.
We turn now to the discussion of the spatial relationship. The bottommost part of
Table 3 shows two Moran I statistics (Moran, 1950), for each country respectively. These
statistics indicate that spatial autocorrelation is at present in both countries, but stronger
in France. The data generating process in spatial models could either follow a spatial
autoregressive model or a spatial error model, where spatial dependence arises only in the
disturbances (see LeSage and Pace (2009) for a detailed discussion of spatial modeling).
Hence, we have to assure that our spatial lag specification according to equation 6 is the
proper one. We use the Lagrange Multiplier test introduced by Anselin et al. (2008) for
spatial error correlation and a spatially lagged dependent variable, which is robust against
the alternative form, respectively. The p-values of these tests indicate that the spatial
error model can be rejected, whereas the spatial lag model according to our specification
is accepted.
Model (2) includes only the spatial lag variables, ρ1 for interactions among German
municipalities, ρ2 for interactions between French jurisdictions, and ρ3 for cross-border
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interactions. As expected after the results of the previous tests, the within-country
interactions are significant on either side of the border. The non-significance of ρ3 shows
that interactions across the border do not take place. We include the other covariates
successively in models (3) to (7) and estimate the full model in (8). The Hansen-J test
indicates that the orthogonality of the set of instruments with respect to the residuals
cannot be rejected in any model. Furthermore, the Difference-in-Hansen test on the time
lags as additional instruments does not reject their validity.
Most exogenous variables, beside the demographic structure, lose their significance
when spatial lags are included. The last estimation in column (8), however, shows that
the tax rates within the two countries are correlated with the tax rates chosen by their
neighboring jurisdictions. The significant coefficients ρ1 and ρ2 confirm that local ju-
risdictions within a given country interact over their tax rates. This interactions turn
out to be stronger in France, relative to Germany. This is in line with the results of
previous studies on German and French data. However, local domestic tax decisions are
not related to those decisions undertaken on the other side of the border since ρ3 is never
found to be significantly different from zero.10
Table 5 shows results from the dynamic panel data regression according to model 8
to corroborate our results.11 We use all covariates as instruments as before, excluding
a trend and squared trend variable. We use the second and third lag of the dependent
variable in order to deal with lagged dependent endogeneity. Our coefficient of main
interest ρ3 on the interactions across the border is again not different from zero at any
conventional level of significance.
[Table 5 about here]
The Hansen-J test p-value is around 0.5 and A/B test for AR(2) as well as for AR(1)
reveals that autocorrelation is treated in the right way. We use 81 instruments, an accept-
able number compared to the number of cross-sections in these estimations. This ensures
that the Hansen test is not weakened by the proliferation of instruments. Both other
spatially decomposed variables targeting internal competition are significant and posi-
tive, confirming the static results.12 Thus, our result of absent cross-border interactions
is robust to a dynamic specification of the model.
A related question is whether the border or a gap in infrastructure is responsible for
this result. The use of adjacent municipalities as neighbors, independent of the ways
10As an additional proof to underpin this result, separate models for both countries were estimated
with maximum likelihood methods. We analyzed the spatial correlation between the regression leavings
(residuals and estimated fixed effects) in a second step for various combinations of spatial weights. As
the results never indicate any relationship across the border, results are not reported here.
11We only present the coefficients of main interest. The full set of results from this estimation is given
in B.2
12The point estimates are not restricted to be lower than one since each individual part of the weighting
matrix is non-standardized.
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how to reach them, suggest that direct information spill-over could be excluded as the
underlying reason as long as the results are non-significant. When taxes are set in order
to attract, or at least not to lose capital, municipalities which are easy to reach are
the more relevant competitors. We compute weights based on distance to analyze this
question. We distinguish between weights where the pure air-line distance is used from
another set of weights where the Rhine, and hence the border, could be only crossed
where infrastructure allows that. In other words, the measure of the distance takes into
account that a bridge or a ferry has to be crossed to commute from France to Germany
and vice verse.
[Table 6 about here]
Columns (1) and (3) show the pure distance results, according to equation 7, while the
infrastructure is taken into account in columns (2) and (4). The first two estimations
cut-off distance after 15 kilometers, while the last two do so after 30. Although the
results in table 6 do not indicate differences between both alternatives, we can exclude
any explanation for possible interactions. Since results of the cross-border term are
insignificant in the infrastructure specification, domestic tax rates do not respond at all
to those of potential nearby competitors for capital.
7. Conclusion
The differentiation between levels of government in the empirical literature on fiscal
interactions created a gap, which our aim is to fill. It is now well documented that
taxation decisions on the national level depend on decisions taken in other countries on
the same level. The same is true for sub-national governments within the borderline of
a specific state. Whether domestic local governments act in a similar manner with their
foreign counterparts, however, is an open question.
The aim of this paper was to tackle this question empirically. The European Union
with the common internal market offers a convenient environment, because legal barriers
to the free movement of capital were abolished. The Franco-German context is of par-
ticular interest, since revenues from business taxation are an important element of local
governments’ budgets and have an intense impact on the after-tax profits of firms. Local
jurisdictions in the border area, from which we construct our sample, could thus try to
increase their tax base by offering good tax conditions. This could be either done relative
to other domestic, relative to other foreign, or relative to any other jurisdiction.
Our results do not confirm that a domestic municipality interacts with a foreign one.
Although we apply a variety of definitions about neighborhood, significant interaction
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terms could never be found. Albeit this is true in the local-international context, in-
teractions take place domestically in both countries. This finding is consistent with the
view that local jurisdictions regard only their domestic counterparts as relevant, taking
an earlier choice over the country as given. Overall, we find strong evidence for a border
effect in local tax setting.
An intuitive explanation for our result is that costs connected with cross-border com-
petition are comparatively high. Other national characteristics, beside pure tax elements,
might be more important for the decision where to settle down for doing business. In
particular, the institutional and cultural framework of a different country, and a different
language, might determine this outcome, rather than a small differential in tax rates.
Once this decision is taken, the question in which specific region the investment should
take place, remains open. Thus, local governments try to avoid being unattractive only
relative to their domestic neighbors, what creates the border effect we have found. Our
result can also be interpreted as an indirect test for regional mobility of capital, which
does not seem to be very mobile across the Rhine.
Moreover, taxes are always set by politicians. Their costs of comparing the domestic
tax code with the foreign one are also higher than in a pure within-country context. The
different tax base can create a particular problem for local politicians in order to evaluate
their position relative to foreign municipalities.
Even though we find no empirical evidence for local interactions across national borders
and a strong border effect, this calls for further theoretical work analyzing under which
conditions interactions would be likely to occur. The variety in sub-national taxation
systems, languages and other characteristics in Europe would also allow for further em-
pirical research in different directions. Future work could concentrate on regions, where
some barriers are absent (for instance, language in the German-Austrian context) or
when the mobility of capital is affected (accession to the European Union). The further
understanding of the border effect in a borderless Europe seems to be an interesting
question.
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Figure 1: Revenues from own-source taxation
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Germany
local eatr overall 0.136 0.006 0.121 0.159 N = 1320
between 0.005 0.123 0.158 n = 165
within 0.002 0.119 0.150 T = 8
vertical eatr overall 0.241 0.017 0.231 0.285
between 0.000 0.241 0.241
within 0.017 0.231 0.285
France
local eatr overall 0.030 0.009 0.007 0.060 N = 3496
between 0.009 0.011 0.058 n = 437
within 0.002 0.013 0.051 T = 8
vertical eatr overall 0.316 0.007 0.308 0.333
between 0.001 0.315 0.317
within 0.007 0.309 0.332
Table 1: Summary statistics: tax variables
24
F
ra
n
ce
 
G
e
rm
a
n
y
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
a
n
d
 
T
he
lig
ht
gr
ay
sh
ad
ed
ar
ea
re
pr
es
en
ts
ou
r
sm
al
l
sa
m
pl
e,
w
ith
a
m
ax
im
um
di
st
an
ce
of
20
km
to
th
e
bo
rd
er
lin
e.
T
he
da
rk
gr
ay
sh
ad
ed
m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
ar
e
ad
di
tio
na
lo
bs
er
va
tio
ns
in
th
e
la
rg
er
sa
m
pl
e,
an
d
no
t
m
or
e
th
an
30
km
di
st
an
t
to
th
e
bo
rd
er
.
Fi
gu
re
2:
R
eg
io
n
an
d
sa
m
pl
e
c ©
Eu
ro
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
cs
25
Decomposition of the EATR. Each dot represents the overall tax burden in a specific municipality. Lines
represent the tax burden due to higher than local level governments. The distance from zero to the
respective line is the measure of the vertical tax burden in our estimations. The difference between the
line and each dot is the additional local tax burden, which we use in logs as our dependent variable.
Figure 3: Effective average tax rates 2000-2007
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Germany
pp15 overall 16.894 2.004 6.154 23.958 N = 1320
between 1.751 9.617 20.839 n = 165
within 0.984 10.650 20.046 T = 8
pp65 overall 16.996 3.088 7.612 28.429
between 2.833 8.547 26.987
within 1.244 13.057 20.843
unempl overall 3.381 1.148 0.000 9.187
between 1.003 0.000 7.443
within 0.563 1.439 5.810
dens overall 294.219 254.017 16.931 1698.551
between 254.611 18.034 1671.332
within 6.490 243.381 336.992
log gdp (t-1) overall 10.063 0.178 9.732 10.632
between 0.162 9.856 10.505
within 0.075 9.914 10.224
France
pp15 overall 19.450 2.231 10.369 29.167 N = 3496
between 2.045 14.192 25.799 n = 437
within 0.896 14.617 24.356 T = 8
pp65 overall 13.819 2.963 4.974 26.007
between 2.849 5.661 23.503
within 0.826 9.726 17.962
unempl overall 5.854 2.161 0.000 15.791
between 1.962 0.985 13.955
within 0.909 0.566 10.083
dens overall 177.042 219.673 19.415 2238.687
between 219.775 21.750 2184.338
within 7.212 122.774 231.391
log gdp (t-1) overall 10.055 0.102 9.862 10.241
between 0.048 10.003 10.100
within 0.090 9.906 10.205
Table 2: Summary statistics: control variables
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
de pp15 -0.003* -0.003 -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
de pp65 0.003* -0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
de unempl -0.012*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
de dens -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
de log reg gdp -0.006 0.017 -0.012
(0.043) (0.042) (0.041)
fr pp15 -0.006* -0.004* -0.004*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
fr pp65 -0.004* -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
fr unempl -0.007*** -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
fr dens 0.002** 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
fr log reg gdp 0.354*** 0.025 0.044
(0.060) (0.058) (0.065)
vertical eatr 0.117** -0.040 -0.008
(0.046) (0.055) (0.050)
ρ1 0.441** 0.512*** 0.406** 0.496*** 0.488*** 0.435** 0.530***
(0.191) (0.161) (0.199) (0.172) (0.156) (0.192) (0.163)
ρ2 0.922*** 0.937*** 0.915*** 0.908*** 0.921*** 0.917*** 0.911***
(0.095) (0.117) (0.096) (0.101) (0.124) (0.097) (0.132)
ρ3 0.006 -0.024 0.017 0.021 -0.105 0.050 0.024
(0.115) (0.090) (0.113) (0.108) (0.099) (0.124) (0.123)
R-squared 0.328 0.404 0.407 0.405 0.405 0.404 0.404 0.409
Hansen J . 3.280 3.397 2.747 3.655 3.520 3.485 3.382
Hansen J (p-value) . 0.350 0.494 0.601 0.455 0.475 0.480 0.496
Diff. Hansen Lags . . . . . . . 2.579
p-value . . . . . . . 0.461
Moran’s I DE 0.08*** . . . . . . .
Moran’s I FR 0.31*** . . . . . . .
LM lag (p-value) 0.00 . . . . . . .
LM error (p-value) 0.99 . . . . . . .
Robust standard errors in parentheses, n=347, T=8
tax variables in logs, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Results with 6NN weights used, 20KM distance
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
de pp15 -0.002* -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
de pp65 0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
de unempl -0.011*** -0.003* -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
de dens -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
de log reg gdp -0.029 0.000 -0.020
(0.043) (0.042) (0.041)
fr pp15 -0.005** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
fr pp65 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
fr unempl -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
fr dens 0.001** -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
fr log reg gdp 0.266*** 0.008 0.004
(0.049) (0.051) (0.053)
vertical eatr 0.108*** -0.051 -0.026
(0.030) (0.042) (0.040)
ρ1 0.530*** 0.512*** 0.488*** 0.554*** 0.553*** 0.518*** 0.503***
(0.177) (0.127) (0.180) (0.166) (0.138) (0.181) (0.125)
ρ2 0.904*** 0.913*** 0.897*** 0.901*** 0.896*** 0.897*** 0.891***
(0.080) (0.096) (0.081) (0.084) (0.104) (0.082) (0.107)
ρ3 -0.037 -0.040 -0.036 -0.017 0.003 0.016 0.071
(0.102) (0.087) (0.099) (0.097) (0.105) (0.117) (0.126)
R-squared 0.298 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.373 0.375
Hansen J . 1.410 2.018 0.943 1.887 1.754 0.683 1.534
Hansen J (p-value) . 0.842 0.733 0.918 0.757 0.781 0.953 0.821
Diff. Hansen Lags . . . . . . . 0.366
p-value . . . . . . . 0.947
Robust standard errors in parentheses, n=602, T=8
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Results with 6NN weights used, 30KM distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ3 0.016 0.023 -0.023 -0.297
std. err. (0.134) (0.101) (0.142) (0.182)
A/B test AR(2) 0.679 0.397 0.538 0.309
Hansen J 0.501 0.934 0.544 0.582
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p-values are reported for tests
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
# instruments: 81, 20km n=347, 30km n=602, T=8
Difference-GMM estimations. Model (1) and (3) are based on the 30km sample, (2) and (4) on the 20km
sample. The first two regressions use a weighting scheme on the 8 nearest neighbors, while the last two
models are based on 6 nearest neighbors.
Table 5: Dynamic panel data estimation
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
DIST15 INFRA15 DIST30 INFRA30
ρ1 0.773*** 0.746*** 1.162** 1.018***
(0.213) (0.205) (0.487) (0.391)
ρ2 1.130*** 1.146*** 1.509*** 1.520***
(0.145) (0.148) (0.197) (0.200)
ρ3 -0.013 -0.021 -0.066 -0.091
(0.084) (0.068) (0.174) (0.140)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, n=347, T=8
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Static regressions. All estimations are based on the 20km sample. The first two regressions use a
weighting scheme that cuts-off after 15kms, while the last two models cut-off after 30km. Model (1) and
(3) are based on pure air-distances, the weights in model (2) and (4) take the infrastructure into account.
Table 6: Distance based regressions
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A. Local Effective Average Tax Rates
We compute effective average tax rates according to the method proposed by Devereux
and Griffith (2003). This allows us to get comparable measures of the tax burden in
the two countries. The effective average tax rate is defined for a given value p as an
assumption over the financial return of the investment. The net present value of before
tax returns is
R∗ = −1 + 1 + pi1 + i [(p+ δ) + (1− δ)]
In the absence of taxation and (1 + i) = (1 + r)(1 + pi), we obtain
R∗ = p− r1 + r
and our calculation of R as the after-tax net present value follows the examples given in
Devereux et al. (2008), while we allow for different values of subnational taxes for each
jurisdiction.
The EATR is based on the difference between the NPV of the perturbation to the
capital stock in the absence and presence of tax, R∗−R, which is a measure of the total
impact of taxation on the investor. This difference is scaled using the NPV of the pre-tax
total income stream, net of depreciation,
EATR = R
∗ −R
p
(1+r)
Table 7 sums up the values of the economic parameters we use in all calculations. We
use the same economic parameters for the calculation in all periods and both countries
to figure out the evolution of taxation parameters and the differences in the tax systems
rather than the development of economic conditions.
Five different types of investment are considered - buildings, financial assets, machinery,
intangibles and inventories. These hypothetical investments could be financed through
three different sources - retained earnings, debt and new equity. The parametrization
follows strictly the previous studies.
Investments in industrial buildings trigger liability to real estate tax in both countries.
The tax base is determined by the notional annual rent if the property was let on the
open market. However this notional rent is often substantially lower than the market
rental value, even if every year the notional rent is multiplied by a factor to reflect the
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Variable Symbol Value in %
True economic depreciation rate of intangibles δINT 15.35
True economic depreciation rate of industrial buildings δBUI 3.1
True economic depreciation rate of machinery δMAC 17.5
True economic depreciation rate of finacial assets δFIN 0
True economic depreciation rate of inventories δINV 0
Real interest rate r 5
Inflation rate pi 2
Pre-tax rate of return for EATR p 20
Nominal interest rate (%) i = (1 + r)(1 + pi)− 1 7.1
Table 7: Economic Parameters
national variation of prices.13 In Germany these values relate to the locations’ market
values in the past. In these cases, Devereux et al. (2008) made assumptions concerning
the country-specific relation between the acquisition cost used in the model and the tax
value determined by the tax offices. In table 8, we give the rental value rate σ for each
type of capital.
σ machinery buildings
France 16% (tp) 8% (tp) 4% (tf)
Germany 25% (pt)
Table 8: rental value rate Devereux et al. (2008)
Applying this parametrization, the tax laws related to the local taxes (presented in
section 2), and the above described equations, we are able to compute country-specific
effective average tax rates for a set of five investment goods (buildings, machinery, inven-
tory, finacial and intangible assets) and three financing opportunities (retained earnings,
new equity and debt). We compute weighted effective average tax rates for each munici-
pality. According to OECD (1991) we use the following weights: 55% retained earnings,
10% new equity, and 35% debt. Next, we follow the European Commission 2001 and use
equal weights for each asset to calculate municipal-specific averages of the EATR. We
obtain the tax rates of the different governmental levels by setting the taxes on other
levels equal to zero.
13In France, the individual values of properties have not been reviewed by tax authorities since 1974.
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B. Additional tables
The full set of results from the intsrumental variables regressions are presented in this
section.
B.1. Full IV-Estimates
Table 9 presents the estimations over a variation of different weights based on nearest
neighbor criterions, ranging from NN4 to NN8 over both sub-samples. The full set of
estimations with distance based weights is shown in table 10. This table shows in addition
the full results for weights where the infrastructure is taken into account.
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B.2. Full GMM-Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES GMM 8NN 30km GMM 8NN 20km GMM 6NN 30km GMM 6NN 20km
eatr (t-1) -0.119*** -0.078 -0.073* -0.085
(0.043) (0.056) (0.039) (0.058)
ρ1 0.874*** 0.817*** 0.958*** 0.775***
(0.222) (0.151) (0.219) (0.174)
ρ2 0.923*** 0.847*** 1.023** 0.895***
(0.312) (0.315) (0.505) (0.266)
ρ3 0.016 0.023 -0.023 -0.297
(0.134) (0.101) (0.142) (0.182)
pp15 -0.002 0.007 -0.005 -0.012
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
pp65 0.000 -0.009 0.008 -0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009)
unempl -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
dens -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
log reg gdp -0.021 -0.027 -0.020 0.009
(0.060) (0.049) (0.055) (0.048)
trend -0.002 0.005 -0.007 0.007
(0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012)
trendsq 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
fr unempl -0.021 -0.019 -0.012 -0.018
(0.025) (0.016) (0.033) (0.017)
fr dens 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
fr pp15 -0.008 -0.012 -0.015 -0.005
(0.034) (0.029) (0.053) (0.042)
fr pp65 0.032 0.014 0.003 0.013
(0.046) (0.029) (0.061) (0.035)
vertical eatr -0.004 -0.025 0.004 -0.046
(0.049) (0.043) (0.074) (0.039)
A-B test AR(2) (p-value) 0.679 0.397 0.538 0.309
Hansen test (p-value) 0.501 0.934 0.544 0.582
T=8, 20km n=347, 30km n=602, Number of instruments: 81
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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